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MOBILE STEEL AND BEYOND: TRENDS
IN EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION
LYDIA E. NyzIo*
I. INTRODUCTION
A corporation's initial financial structure generally consists
of debt as well as capital contributions. Although a shareholder
is not a creditor of the corporation in which he owns stock,1 a
shareholder may acquire the additional status of creditor by ad-
vancing a loan to the corporation. The primary advantages of
lending money to a business rather than merely purchasing
stock are favorable tax treatment2 and lower risk in the event of
the corporation's liquidation.
Lending money to a corporation results in favorable tax
treatment for three reasons. First, since the corporation is enti-
tled to a deduction of the interest paid on indebtedness,3 the
interest payments received by the shareholder creditor are only
subject to taxation once-when received by the shareholder-
creditor. Stock dividends, on the other hand, may be paid only
out of after-tax earnings and are, therefore, subject to "double
taxation."'4 Second, the corporation's repayment of the loan
principal is considered a nontaxable return of capital.5 Third, a
shareholder who lends money to his corporation may fully de-
* Associate, Finkel, Georgaklis, Goldberg, Sheftman & Korn, P.A., Columbia, South
Carolina. B.A., University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 1976; J.D., University of South
Carolina School of Law, 1984.
The author expresses her gratitude to law student Peter Roest for his contribution
to the research and preparation of this Article. Without his valuable input publication of
this Article would not have been possible.
1. 18A Am. JuR. 2D Corporations § 488 (1985).
2. See Note, Equitable Subordination of Shareholder Debt to Trade Creditors: A
Reexamination, 61 B.U.L. REv. 433, 433-34 n. 3 (1981). See also Anderson, "Thin" Cor-
porate Capitalization, 1957 S. CALw. TAX INST. 35; Holland, Tax Effects of Stockholder
Loans to Corporations, 9 N.Y.U. FED. TAX INsT. 1003 (1951).
3. I.R.C. § 163 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). See sources cited supra note 2.
4. I.R.C. §§ 11(a), 301 (1982 & Supp. H 1984); 306 (1982). See sources cited supra
note 2.
5. J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 28 (2d ed. 1973). See sources cited supra
note 2.
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duct a bad debt incurred in his trade or business; 6 even if the
bad debt is not incurred in the shareholder's trade or business, it
is deductible as a short-term capital loss. 7 Losses on stock are
not entitled to such favorable treatment if the stock was held for
more than six months.'
The advantage of holding creditor status on a corporation's
liquidation results from the priority accorded creditors. The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the Bankruptcy Code) provides
that a corporation undergoing a Chapter 7 liquidation proceed-
ing must satisfy all creditors' claims before its shareholders can
receive any distribution of its assets.' Since a corporation that
has filed for relief under Chapter 7 rarely has assets sufficient to
cover all its obligations, the shareholders may be left out en-
tirely. The risk of lending money to a corporation is, therefore,
significantly lower than that associated with ownership of the
corporation's stock.
There is nothing inherently wrong with a shareholder's ad-
vancing money to his business in the form of a loan.10 In fact, in
the case of the closely-held corporation, shareholders are often
the most appropriate or even the only source of cash for contin-
uing operations.1' While the business is solvent, the classification
of a shareholder's loan to the corporation matters little. When
the corporation is unable to pay its debts as they come due,
however, the problem of priority may arise. A dominant or con-
trolling shareholder, as a fiduciary of the corporation, 2 has the
burden of proving that his loan transaction with the company
was inherently fair and entered into in good faith.13
In certain circumstances, equity may require that a share-
holder's claim as a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding be either
subordinated to the claims of general trade creditors or disal-
6. I.R.C. § 166 (1982). See sources cited supra note 2.
7. See I.R.C. §§ 165(f)-(g), 166 (1978); 1211 (1982); 1212 (1982 & West Supp. 1986).
See also sources cited supra note 2.
8. I.R.C. § 1222 (Supp. II 1984).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
10. In re Black Ranches, Inc., 362 F.2d 19, 37 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990
(1966); Goldstein v. Wolfson, 132 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1943); Obre v. Alban Tractor
Co., 228 Md. 291, 294, 179 A.2d 861, 862 (1961); Hanson v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 379,
10 N.E.2d 259, 263 (1937); 18A Am. Ju. 2D Corporations § 504 (1985).
11. Small v. Williams, 313 F.2d 39, 42 (4th Cir. 1963).
12. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939).
13. Spach v. Bryant, 309 F.2d 886, 888-89 (5th Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 37
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lowed altogether. A bankruptcy court, as a court of equity,14 has
the power to adjust certain claims against a debtor corporation,
and the Bankruptcy Code expressly acknowledges the court's
power to disallow15 or subordinate 6 claims.
Traditionally, bankruptcy courts have used similar princi-
ples for the equitable subordination of both controlling share-
holders' and parent corporations' claims against the debtor cor-
poration. The following are the most common grounds for
subordinating these claims: (1) the existence of fraud or illegal-
ity in the particular transaction; (2) severe undercapitalization
of the corporation, attributable to the claimant; and (3) the exis-
tence of such complete control of the corporation that it is es-
sentially an instrumentality or "alter ego" of the claimant. His-
torically, it has been very difficult to predict with any certainty
whether a court will exercise its power of equitable subordina-
tion. Courts have decided each case on its particular facts, and
different courts have emphasized different factors in applying
broad equitable principles.
In In re Mobile Steel Co.,'1 the Fifth Circuit set forth cer-
tain threshold conditions that must be met before a court exer-
cises its power to subordinate a claim in bankruptcy. One com-
mentator has concluded that "Mobile Steel's three-pronged test
and other principles enunciated in the case should define more
clearly responsibilities of the courts in this area and also provide
corporate insiders with the guidelines they so desperately need
in making advances to their corporations.""
Part II of this Article provides a general examination of the
doctrine of equitable subordination as it has been applied to
claims by controlling or dominant shareholders and by parent
corporations. Part III describes the principles enunciated by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Mobile Steel opinion. Fi-
nally, parts IV and V analyze the effect these guidelines have
had on subsequent decisions by other courts that have consid-
ered claims by both insiders and noninsiders.
14. Bank of Matin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966); Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S.
726, 732 (1946); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 510 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
17. 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977).
18. Note, Deep Rock in the Deep South: Equitable Subordination of Claims in
Fifth Circuit Bankruptcy Proceedings, 11 CuA. L. REv. 619, 637 (1980).
1986]
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II. OVERVIEW OF EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION
As noted above, the bankruptcy court's power to order sub-
ordination of certain claims grew out of the court's general equi-
table powers.19 Disallowance of claims, on the other hand, has
long been statutorily authorized.2 ° When a claim is disallowed, it
is considered invalid and nonexistent for purposes of distribut-
ing the debtor's assets. Thus, the entity whose claim is disal-
lowed effectively loses its status as a creditor in the bankruptcy
proceeding.
In contrast, subordination of a creditor's claim does not nec-
essarily negate the claim. A subordinated claim remains a valid
claim against the debtor's estate, but, under equitable princi-
ples, enjoys a lower status than the claims of general creditors.
In practice, of course, subordination of a claim is tantamount to
disallowance if the debtor's assets are insufficient to satisfy all
allowed claims.21
The Bankruptcy Code now expressly authorizes the subor-
dination of claims.22 Of particular significance for claims by
19. For a discussion of the bankruptcy court's pre-Bankruptcy Code jurisdiction to
order equitable subordination, see Herzog & Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of
Claims in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 83, 83-85 (1961).
20. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 2(2), 57(k), 30 Stat. 544, 545, 561 (1898);
11 U.S.C. § 502 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
21. For discussions of the distinction between disallowance and subordination of
claims in bankruptcy, see Reimer, Claims Against Bankrupt Corporations Based on Ad-
vances by Controlling Stockholders or Parent Corporations, 73 COM. L.J. 273, 274
(1968); Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 19, at 85-88.
22. Section 510 provides:
(a) A subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under this title to
the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law.
(b) For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim arising from
rescission of a purchase or sale of a security of the debtor or of an affiliate of
the debtor, for damages arising from the purchase or sale of such a security, or
for reimbursement or contribution allowed under section 502 on account of
such a claim, shall be subordinated to all claims or interests that are senior to
or equal the claim or interest represented by such security, except that if such
security is common stock, such claim has the same priority as common stock.
(c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, after notice
and a hearing, the court may-
(1) Under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for
purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of
another allowed claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part
of another allowed interest; or
4
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shareholders or parent corporations is section 510(c), which spe-
cifically refers to "principles of equitable subordination." The
statute, however, provides no specific guidelines for applying the
concept; it was Congress' intent that the courts develop the doc-
trine of equitable subordination by basing their holdings on
prior case law.23 Thus, the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code
has not produced any clear-cut rules for the courts to follow in
determining whether a particular claim should be subordinated.
Courts that have decided to subordinate a shareholder's or a
parent corporation's claim against the estate of a debtor corpo-
ration have generally focused on the existence of one or more of
the three factors listed above: (1) fraud or illegality, (2) under-
capitalization, and (3) the claimant's complete domination and
control of the business.24
In order for a court to disallow or subordinate a claim on
the basis of fraud, it is not necessary that all the elements of
common-law fraud be present. The term "fraud" in this context
has a much broader scope. For example, in Pepper v. Litton,25
the seminal case on the doctrine of equitable subordination, the
Supreme Court found that a stockholder's breach of his fiduci-
ary duty to the debtor corporation was sufficient to trigger the
subordination of his claim.
In Litton the controlling shareholder caused his corporation
to confess a judgment in his favor for salary claims. When the
corporation filed for bankruptcy, he then attempted to use his
claim to deplete the corporation's assets-to the detriment of
Pepper, an outside creditor. The United States Supreme Court
upheld the lower court's subordination of Litton's claim on the
basis of "cardinal principles of equity jurisprudence. ' 26 Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, stated that in cases such as Lit-
ton "a sufficient consideration [to support a finding of fraud]
may be simply the violation of rules of fair play and good con-
science by the claimant; a breach of the fiduciary standards of
conduct which he owes the corporation, its stockholders and
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be trans-
ferred to the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 510 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
23. 124 CONG. REc. 11,095, 17,412 (1978).
24. See supra text following note 16.
25. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
26. Id. at 306.
1986]
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creditors. '27
Another type of fraudulent conduct that can result in subor-
dination of a claim is misrepresentation of a corporation's finan-
cial condition. 8 When one creditor knowingly misrepresents the
corporation's financial status and other creditors extend credit
in reliance on that misinformation, courts will often subordinate
the fraudulent creditor's claim to the claims of creditors who
suffered injury thereby.
A related basis for subordination is illegality. If a creditor's
claim arises from an agreement that is itself illegal, the claim
will of course be disallowed entirely. In contrast, courts will or-
der subordination when the illegality bears more than an inci-
dental relationship to the claim asserted.29
Yet another situation that may give rise to subordination is
undercapitalization of the debtor corporation. This occurs when
the corporation's shareholders fail to supply sufficient amounts
of paid-in capital for the business' operation. When a share-
holder lends money to his undercapitalized corporation and then
asserts a claim as a creditor in bankruptcy, the court will gener-
ally disregard the form of the transaction and will treat the
"loan" as a contribution to capital. This treatment may result in
the shareholder's claim being relegated to a status that is just
above, equal to, or even below that of other shareholders.3 0
The undercapitalization cases reveal a great deal of judicial
confusion. First, a court must determine whether the corpora-
tion has an insufficient amount of paid-in capital. To this end,
courts generally consider a number of factors, including the cor-
poration's debt-equity ratio,31 expert testimony regarding the
reasonableness of the corporation's capital structure," and the
27. Id. at 310-11.
28. See, eog., E. E. Gray Corp. v. Meehan, 54 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1931).
29. See, e.g., Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp. v. United States, 151 F.2d 461 (6th Cir.
1945)(court subordinated claim based on transaction conducted for primary purpose of
restraining competition in violation of antitrust laws). See also Schwartz v. Mills, 192
F.2d 727, 729 (2d Cir. 1951); West 52nd Theatre Co. v. Tyler, 178 F.2d 128, 129 (2d Cir.
1949); Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 19, at 100; Note, supra note 18, at 629.
30. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 73-74 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE
CONG, & AD. NEws 5787.
31. See, e.g., In re Fett Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 438 F. Supp. 726, 730 (E.D. Va.
1977), a/I'd, 605 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1979); In re Brunner Air Compressor Corp., 287 F.
Supp. 256, 261-62 (N.D.N.Y. 1968).
32. See, eg., In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 703 (5th Cir. 1977); Costello v.
[Vol. 37
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corporation's use of the loan to purchase permanent assets of
the business.3
Many courts have also required some indication of the
shareholder's intent to undercapitalize before subordinating his
claim.3 4 This intent may be inferred, however, from the share-
holder's failure to enforce timely repayment of the "loan" so
that the money advanced by the shareholder is in effect a part of
the corporation's paid-in capital.35 Case law has given rise to
some controversy over whether a court should subordinate a
shareholder's claim on the basis of undercapitalization alone or
whether some additional misconduct by the shareholder is a nec-
essary prerequisite to equitable subordination. 6
Finally, courts have subordinated the claims of creditors,
whether individuals or parent corporations, who exercised such
control that the bankrupt was considered a mere "instrumental-
ity" or alter ego of the creditors. In a close corporation, a single
person or parent corporation often owns all or a majority of the
stock, manages the business, and effectively controls all the com-
pany's affairs. Under these circumstances, when the corporation
files for bankruptcy, the dominant shareholder who files a claim
against the debtor's estate is in effect attempting to prove a
claim against himself.
The older cases held that the presence of the "instrumental-
Fazio, 256 F.2d 903, 906-07 (9th Cir. 1958).
33. See, e.g., Boyum v. Johnson, 127 F.2d 491, 494 (8th Cir. 1942); Arnold v. Phil-
lips, 117 F.2d 497, 501 (5th Cir. 1941).
34. See, e.g., In re Brunner Air Compressor Corp., 287 F. Supp. 256, 261 (N.D.N.Y.
1968); In re Mader's Store for Men, Inc., 77 Wis. 2d 578, 604-05, 254 N.W.2d 171, 186
(1977). See also Boyui v. Johnson, 127 F.2d 491, 494 (8th Cir. 1942); Arnold v. Phillips,
117 F.2d 497, 501 (5th Cir. 1941); In re Fett Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 438 F. Supp.
726, 730 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 605 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1979). But see In re Mobile Steel
Co., 563 F.2d 692, 702 (5th Cir. 1977).
35. See Boyum v. Johnson, 127 F.2d 491, 494 (8th Cir. 1942); Arnold v. Phillips, 117
F.2d 497, 501 (5th Cir. 1941); In re Fett Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 438 F. Supp. 726,
730 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 605 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1979); In re Mader's Store for Men,
Inc., 77 Wis. 2d 578, 604-05, 254 N.W.2d 171, 186 (1977). At least one commentator,
however, has argued that the shareholder's intent should not affect an inquiry into the
adequacy of a corporation's capitalization. See Loiseaux, Loans or Capital Contribution
to the Close Corporation, 38 REP. J. 4, 5 (1964).
36. See In re Branding Iron Steak House, 536 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1976); In re Brun-
ner Air Compressor Corp., 287 F. Supp. 256 (N.D.N.Y. 1968)(undercapitalization alone is
sufficient for subordination). For a persuasive argument that undercapitalization alone
should warrant subordination of a controlling shareholder's claim, see Note, supra note
2.
19861
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ity" relationship itself was sufficient to subordinate a controlling
shareholder's or parent corporation's claim.37 Later, this so-
called "pure instrumentality rule" was modified to require some
element of fraud or self-dealing by the claimant before equitable
subordination would be justified.3
Probably the best known instrumentality case is Taylor v.
Standard Gas and Electric Co.,30 which gave rise to a popular
term for equitable subordination, the "Deep Rock" doctrine. In
Taylor the parent corporation, Standard, completely dominated
its subsidiary, Deep Rock. The parent corporation made large
loans to its subsidiary, but also forced Deep Rock to pay large
amounts of dividends on preferred stock so that the preferred
stockholders would not have any voting power under Deep
Rock's corporate charter.40 The Supreme Court subordinated
the parent corporation's claims to those of Deep Rock's general
creditors. The essence of the "Deep Rock" doctrine is that a
court should subordinate a creditor's claim when both control
and mismanagement are present. The Supreme Court later re-
ferred to the Taylor decision as one "based on the equities of
the case-the history of spoliation, mismanagement, and faith-
less stewardship of the affairs of the subsidiary. . to the detri-
ment of the public investors." '41
A further step in the development of the instrumentality
concept occurred when the Supreme Court decided Comstock v.
Group of Institutional Investors.42 In that case, the Court
stated: "It is not the mere existence of an opportunity to do
wrong which brings the [Deep Rock] rule into play, it is the un-
conscionable use of the opportunity afforded by the domination
to advantage itself at the injury of the subsidiary that deprives
37. In re Watertown Paper Co., 169 F. 252 (2d Cir. 1909). See, e.g., Hunter v. Baker
Motor Vehicle Co., 225 F. 1006 (N.D.N.Y. 1915).
38. Forbush Co. v. Bartley, 78 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1935); Commerce Trust Co. v.
Woodbury, 77 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1935); Duffy v. Treide, 75 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1935); Finn
v. George T. Mickle Lumber Co., 41 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1930); Majestic Co. v. Orpheum
Circuit, Inc., 21 F.2d 720 (8th Cir. 1927); N.Y. Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 250 F. 668 (6th
Cir. 1918); Peckett v. Wood, 234 F. 833 (3d Cir. 1916).
39. 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
40. Id. at 320 n. 4.
41. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 308 (1939). Elements of instrumentality were
also present in Litton, in which the Court relied on such abstract notions as "fair play"
and "good conscience" to invoke equitable subordination.
42. 335 U.S. 211 (1948).
[Vol. 37
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the wrongdoer of the fruits of his wrong.""3 This language indi-
cated the Court's complete rejection of the "pure instrumental-
ity rule" for equitable subordination. It is now apparent that, in
addition to a claimant's complete domination of a debtor corpo-
ration, some element of fraud, mismanagement, breach of fiduci-
ary duty, or self-dealing must be present before a court will eq-
uitably subordinate the shareholder's or parent corporation's
claim.
III. MOBILE STEEL: SOME THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS
When the Fifth Circuit decided In re Mobile Steel Co.,44 the
law of equitable subordination was in some confusion. Courts
were applying vague standards-notably "fair play and good
conscience" 4 5 -to determine the propriety of equitable subordi-
nation. Although the decision to subordinate a claim is necessa-
rily based on the facts of each case, it is desirable for the courts
to develop more concrete standards by which to judge the facts.
This is what the Fifth Circuit attempted to develop in the Mo-
bile Steel opinion.
The factual setting of Mobile Steel was fairly complex. The
parties pressing claims against the corporate debtor's estate in-
cluded the organizers, officers, and directors of Mobile Steel
Company, members of their families, and a corporation that was
in essence the alter ego of one of the individual claimants. In
addition, two sets of claims were at issue in the case.
The E.B.F. Company was formed on February 18, 1965. A
short time later, E.B.F. purchased the assets of the old Mobile
Steel Company for approximately $1.2 million. E.B.F. financed
this purchase in part by a $250,000 loan from three of its officers
who received debentures in return. E.B.F. then changed its
name to "Mobile Steel Company, Inc." Because of E.B.F.'s
purchase of old Mobile Steel, the new company was short of
cash and was forced to borrow over $800,000 to finance its
operations.46
43. Id. at 229.
44. 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977).
45. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 310-11 (1939); In re Ahlswede, 516 F.2d
784, 788 (9th Cir. 1975); Braddy v. Randolph, 352 F.2d 80, 84 (4th Cir. 1965).
46. 563 F.2d at 696-97.
1986]
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Later in 1965 Mobile Steel acquired a subsidiary, McGowin-
Lyons Hardware & Supply Co., Inc., which purchased $185,000
of the debentures from the three officers. In 1968 McGowin-Ly-
ons was dissolved, relieving Mobile Steel of its obligation to pay
on the debentures. The remaining $65,000 of debentures, by
which Mobile Steel was still bound, provided the basis for one
set of claims in Mobile Steel's bankruptcy.
47
In 1966 McGowin-Lyons, Mobile Steel's subsidiary, received
$400,000 from a condemnation sale. When McGowin-Lyons was
dissolved, its opportunity under the Internal Revenue Code48 to
avoid recognizing the capital gain by reinvesting the proceeds in
similar property passed to the parent corporation, Mobile Steel.
The deadline for this reinvestment was December 31, 1969.
Shortly before that time, the partnership of Benjamin, Tumlin
& Woods agreed to sell Mobile Steel some commercial property
in Savannah, Georgia for $236,364.83. The sale was consum-
mated through promissory notes and mortgages, and no cash
changed hands in the transaction. Benjamin, Tumlin & Woods
consisted of three of the claimants: two individuals and the alter
ego corporation.49
In 1970 Mobile Steel entered into an agreement with Ingalls
Iron Works Company, under which Ingalls would purchase an-
other Mobile Steel subsidiary, Jones & Armstrong Steel Co.,
Inc., for $600,000. Mobile Steel had agreed to transfer the Sa-
vannah property free and clear to Jones & Armstrong in ex-
change for the cancellation of an account receivable; this trans-
fer was part of the consideration received by Ingalls under the
1970 agreement. Upon dissolution of Benjamin, Tumlin &
Woods, Mobile Steel issued new promissory notes to the individ-
ual partners, based on the 1969 sale of the Savannah property.
These notes provided the foundation for the second set of claims
against Mobile Steel's estate.50
The bankruptcy judge disallowed the first set of claims,
which were based on the debentures held by the three E.B.F.
officers, because the claims arose out of contributions to capital.
The judge also subordinated two of the claims based on the
47. Id. at 697.
48, I.R.C. § 1033 (1967).
49. 563 F.2d at 697-98.
50. Id. at 698.
[Vol. 37
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promissory notes held by Benjamin, Tumlin & Woods because of
the claimants' breach of fiduciary duty and lack of good faith in
dealing with Mobile Steel.6 1 The district court affirmed the deci-
sion,52 but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed because
both sets of claims failed to satisfy the court's proposed test for
equitable subordination.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the equitable power of the bank-
ruptcy court to subordinate claims, 53 but set limits on this
power. Initially the court stated that "equitable considerations
can justify only the subordination of claims, not their disallow-
ance." 54 The court explained that when the claimant's inequita-
ble conduct is directed against the debtor, the debtor will have
adequate protection in a legal remedy or defense. Likewise,
other creditors will be fully protected by the equitable remedy of
subordination if the claimant's inequitable conduct is directed
against them. Thus, "[d]isallowance of claims on equitable
grounds would add nothing to the protection against unfairness
already afforded the bankrupt and its creditors." 55
The court then set forth its innovative three-pronged test
for determining the appropriateness of equitable subordination.
First, "[t]he claimant must have engaged in some type of inequi-
table conduct. '5 6 Presumably, "inequitable conduct" would en-
compass fraud and illegality, undercapitalization, and complete
control and domination of a corporation. Second, "[t]he miscon-
duct must have resulted in injury to the creditors of the bank-
rupt or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant."5 Fi-
nally, "[e]quitable subordination of the claim must not be
inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act."58
51. Id. at 695-96.
52. Id. at 696.
53. Id. at 698-99.
54. Id. at 699.
55. Id. n. 10.
56. Id. at 700 (citing Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211, 229
(1948)); Frasher v. Robinson, 458 F.2d 492, 493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 109
(1972); Spach v. Bryant, 309 F.2d 886, 889 (5th Cir. 1962).
57. 563 F.2d at 700 (citing Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S.
211, 229 (1948)); In re Branding Iron Steak House, 536 F.2d 299, 302 (9th Cir. 1976); In
re Brunner Air Compressor Corp., 287 F. Supp. 256, 265 (N.D.N.Y. 1968).
58. 563 F.2d at 700 (citing Luther v. United States, 225 F.2d 495, 499 (10th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 947 (1956)); In re Columbia Ribbon Co., 117 F.2d 999, 1002
(3d Cir. 1941).
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The Mobile Steel court also enunciated three principles for
lower courts to follow in applying the three-pronged test. The
court stated first that a claim may be subordinated whether or
not the inequitable conduct of the claimant was related to ob-
taining or maintaining the claim. 9 Second, the court stated that
''a claim or claims should be subordinated only to the extent
necessary to offset the harm which the bankrupt and its credi-
tors suffered on account of the inequitable conduct." 0 Finally,
and most important, the court addressed allocation of the bur-
den of proof. The court stated that a trustee in bankruptcy who
objects to a claimant's verified proof of claim must present the
court with "some substantial factual basis to support [his] alle-
gation of impropriety."61 Thus, a merely formal objection to a
fiduciary's claim is insufficient to shift to the fiduciary the bur-
den to prove the transaction's good faith and fairness. Without
this requirement, the court feared that a fiduciary would be
forced to show the good faith and fairness of each transaction at
the trustee's whim, with the possible effect of discouraging
"those most interested in a corporation from attempting to sal-
vage it through an infusion of capital." 2
Numerous decisions have cited with approval and adopted
Mobile Steel's three-pronged test for equitably subordinating
claims. Parts IV and V of this Article will examine these cases,
analyzing first those cases arising out of the Fifth Circuit.
IV. MOBILE STEEL IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT: STEPS TOWARD
PREDICTABILITY AND CONSISTENCY?
Cases from the Fifth Circuit that have applied Mobile
Steel's three-pronged test may, for purposes of this analysis, be
classified according to whether the court ordered subordination
of the claims at issue. Some rather detailed discussion of the
facts in each case is necessary to compare the cases for the pre-
dictability and consistency of their outcomes.
59. 563 F.2d at 700 (citing Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939)).
60. 563 F.2d at 701.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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A. Claims Not Subordinated
In In re Dade County Dairies, Inc., 3 a Florida district court
refused to subordinate a creditor's claim. In that case Samfel,
Inc. owned the property occupied by Dade County Dairies, Inc.
Dade County Dairies had for some time prior to its insolvency
been giving Samfel monthly payments nearly twice as large as
the monthly rental rate. Samfel alleged that these monthly pay-
ments were not actually rental payments, but were in satisfac-
tion of a loan Samfel had made to Dade County Dairies. Samfel
failed, however, to prove the existence of the loan and sought to
recover administrative rent for the six-month period during
which the leased premises had been in the possession of the re-
ceiver and the bankruptcy trustee. The bankruptcy judge denied
Samfel's motion for payment of administrative rent, and Samfel
appealed to the district court. Although members of the Feld-
man family completely owned the stock of both Samfel and
Dade County Dairies, the court made no finding that either cor-
poration was the alter ego of the other or of any Feldman family
member. 4
The bankruptcy trustee first argued that the monthly pay-
ments made by Dade County Dairies prior to its insolvency
should be offset against Samfel's claim for administrative rent
because Samfel failed to establish the fact of a loan. The district
court, applying section 68(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, re-
fused to set off the improper "loan" payments against the ad-
ministrative rental claim because the obligations were lacking in
mutuality.6 5
The trustee argued in the alternative that Samfel's claim
was properly denied under principles of equitable subordination.
The district court, however, cited the third prong of the Mobile
Steel test-that equitable subordination of a claim must not be
inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code-and
allowed Samfel's claim in full. The court took a limited view of
the bankruptcy court's equitable powers and concluded that
since section 64(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly estab-
lishes the first priority of administrative rent, the bankruptcy
63. 474 F. Supp. 438 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1979).
64. Id. at 439-40.
65. Id. at 440.
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court is "without equitable power to place it in any other
position.
'66
In In re Multiponics, Inc.,67 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit decided to subordinate one claim, which is dis-
cussed below,6 8 but not to subordinate another. The debtor cor-
poration, Multiponics, Inc., was incorporated in 1968 and filed a
bankruptcy petition in 1971 under Chapter 10 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898. During 1969 Multiponics borrowed a total of
$3,350,000 from Chase Manhattan Bank and Deposit Guaranty
National Bank. Carl Biehl, a founding shareholder and director
of Multiponics, and several other directors extended personal
guaranties for payment of the loan. Biehl was also the sole
shareholder of Machinery Rental, Inc. When Multiponics de-
faulted on its loans in 1971, the banks looked to Biehl for pay-
ment of the $1,711,771.81 then due. About two months after
Multiponics filed its bankruptcy petition, however, Machinery
Rental purchased the promissory notes from the banks and then
filed a proof of claim against Multiponics for the outstanding
balance due."'
The bankruptcy trustee argued that the court should
subordinate Machinery Rental's claim because the corporation
was the alter ego of Biehl. The special master, however, con-
cluded that Machinery Rental had shown a valid business reason
for purchasing the notes and denied subordination on that basis.
The district court held that the master's conclusion was clearly
erroneous and ordered that Machinery Rental's claim be subor-
dinated. 70 The Fifth Circuit reviewed the record and held that
Machinery Rental had indeed purchased the bank notes for a
valid business purpose: "Machinery Rental sought to purchase
the machinery of Multiponics primarily in order to obtain a de-
preciation allowance to reduce Machinery Rental's tax liability
and secondly to rent out the machinery at a profit."7' The trus-
tee had rejected Machinery Rental's written offer to purchase
the machinery and failed to return $50,000 that Machinery
66. Id.
67. 622 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980).
68. See infra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
69. 622 F.2d at 722.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 723.
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Rental paid to keep its offer open."
The court also upheld the master's finding that no alter ego
relationship existed between Biehl and Machinery Rental and
noted that "the alter ego doctrine and piercing of the corporate
veil are truly exceptional doctrines, reserved for those cases
where the officers, directors or stock holders utilized a corporate
entity as a sham to perpetuate [sic] a fraud, to shun personal
liability, or to encompass other truly unique situations. ' 73 Be-
cause the trustee failed to carry its burden of proof on the issue
of the alleged alter ego relationship, 74 the court declined to
subordinate Machinery Rental's claim. In fact, Machinery
Rental succeeded to the banks' preferred status on the notes.
75
In In re Georgian Villa, Inc., 6 a Georgia bankruptcy court
decided not to subordinate a claim based on an exchange agree-
ment. The claimants in that case were Glenmore and Sarah
Carter, the founders and directors of Georgian Villa, Inc. and
Atlanta West General Hospital, Inc., which both filed petitions
in 1977 under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. In
1974 the Carters had entered into a real estate "exchange agree-
ment" with Georgian Villa. The two parties executed the ex-
changes as contemplated, but Georgian Villa failed to convey
one 54.5-acre tract to the Carters. 77 A later agreement obligated
Atlanta West either to convey the tract of land to the Carters or
to pay them $53,225.00, but neither event ever occurred.
78
The receiver for the two corporations filed a complaint that
named the Carters as defendants and sought to sell Georgian
Villa's assets free and clear of all encumbrances and liens. The
Carters, however, claimed that the 54.5-acre parcel was subject
to an implied trust in their favor because they had fulfilled all
their obligations under the exchange agreement. 79
The bankruptcy court held that no implied trust existed.
The court found that the intent of the parties at the time of
conveyance could not be determined because the tract in ques-
72. Id. at 724.
73. Id. at 724-25.
74. Id. at 723.
75. Id. at 725.
76. 10 Bankr. 79 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
77. Id. at 81.
78. Id. at 82.
79. Id.
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tion was never conveyed. The court concluded, however, that
Georgian Villa's failure to convey the land was either a breach of
fiduciary duty or mismanagement.
The receiver also argued that Atlanta West never profited
under the Carters' direction and that the Carters failed to assert
their claim until the debtors encountered financial difficulties.
The court cited Mobile Steel's three-pronged test and guiding
principles. Purporting to rely on one of those principles-that
the objectant to a valid proof of claim must support its allega-
tion with some substantial factual basisS0-the court concluded
that "the objection to the allowance of the Carters' claim on the
ground that it should be equitably subordinated is merely for-
mal."81 The court, therefore, allowed the Carters' claim in full,
but ordered specific performance-conveyance of legal title to
the Carters-rather than payment of money in satisfaction of
the claim.
In a 1981 decision, In re T.E. Mercer Trucking Co.,s2 a
Texas bankruptcy court declined to rule on the subordination of
claims by Fruehauf Corp. against the assets of T.E. Mercer
Trucking Co. and G.E.M. Storage & Terminal Co., Inc., which
had both filed for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. Fruehauf
filed an adversary proceeding for relief from the stay, claiming
"mortgages and security interests in practically all assets of the
debtor corporations.
8 s3
A number of issues were before the court on motions for
summary judgment, including whether Fruehauf's claim should
be subordinated. 4 The court denied the summary judgment mo-
80. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. The court read the third princi-
ple from Mobile Steel as follows: "[D]ealings of a fiduciary are subjected to rigorous
scrutiny and the burden is on the fiduciary to prove good faith and the inherent fairness
of the transactions from the view of the corporation and those interested therein." 10
Bankr. at 86. Perhaps this interpretation suggests some inherent ambiguity in the Mo-
bile Steel opinion itself.
81. Id. at 86. The court failed to enumerate the receiver's specific allegations.
82. 16 Bankr. 176 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
83. Id. at 180.
84. The court also considered several other motions for summary judgment. One of
these was whether the corporate debtors and the trustee had standing to urge applica-
tion to Fruehauf of § 20(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act, which provides that a com-
mon carrier may not lawfully issue any securities without the authorization of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. 49 U.S.C. § 20 (1976). The debtors and the trustees argued
that Fruehauf's loan agreements were actually "securities." The court held that the char-
acterization of the loan agreements was immaterial, 16 Bankr. at 180-81, and that the
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tion for subordination and requested further evidentiary hear-
ings.85 Fruehauf's loan contracts were extraordinary in that they
gave Fruehauf joint control of all bank accounts of the Corpo-
rate Debtors requiring co-signatures for substantial checks,
gave Fruehauf the right to place its designee on the Board of
Directors of the Debtors; required all corporate bylaws, stock
books and certificates to be delivered to Fruehauf s counsel;
gave Fruehauf the right to have one of its employees partici-
pate in the day-to-day operations of the Debtor's premises
with complete veto powers on any items or matters whatsoever;
gave Fruehauf the right to require the liquidation of all assets
of the Debtors and the various other ventures; gave Fruehauf
the right to set salaries of officers and directors; required the
Corporate Debtors to pledge all their stock, and provided in
the event of a dispute between the Mercer management and
the Fruehauf monitoring agent that an appeal would lie to the
Fruehauf management for final determination. 6
The court suggested that such loan agreements might indicate
an alter ego situation sufficient to establish inequitable conduct
under the Mobile Steel test. The trustee was allowed, therefore,
"to amend its pleading so as to make a more definitive state-
ment of Fruehauf's inequitable conduct and the nature and ex-
tent of any alleged damages. '87 The court also indicated that it
would consider whether Fruehauf's conduct resulted in harm to
unsecured creditors.88
In 1983 the Fifth Circuit again relied upon Mobile Steel in
In re Missionary Baptist Foundation of America, Inc.,s9 which
considered the reorganization of a religious nonprofit corpora-
tion and its subsidiaries under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
debtors and the trustee lacked standing to assert a violation of § 20(a), id. at 183.
The court also denied a second motion for summary judgment. The debts of G.E.M.
and Mercer to Fruehauf were evidenced by a consolidated loan agreement. The court
concluded that it was unable to grant summary judgment "on the issue of whether each
corporate debtor was intended to be liable on the entire consolidated indebtedness or
only on its historical share." 16 Bankr. at 185. The resolution of that issue would raise
questions about the adequacy of consideration and the possibility that Fruehauf had
engaged in usury. See id. at 184-86.
85. Id. at 190.
86. Id. at 189-90.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 712 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1983).
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Code.90 The transactions giving rise to the claims involved sev-
eral parties.
In 1975 Land Wall, the president, controller, and director of
Missionary Baptist Foundation of America, Inc. (MBFA),
formed a partnership with Robert G. Huffman, the claimant. In
that same year Wall and Huffman established a corporation
called West Texas Homes. The partnership then purchased a
nursing home with a $228,000 loan from a commercial lender. In
1977 Wall himself purchased another nursing home. Both nurs-
ing homes were sold to MBFA later that year, and MBFA as-
sumed all indebtedness on the properties. Huffman and Wall
each received a promissory note in the amount of $74,007 as evi-
dence of MBFA's indebtedness. Prior to the sale of the homes to
MBFA, West Texas Homes operated both homes under contrac-
tual agreements. At the time of the sale West Texas Homes as-
signed its contractual rights in the homes to MBFA and received
two promissory notes, each in the amount of $88,860. When
West Texas Homes later dissolved, Huffman and Wall each re-
ceived one of the notes. At the time of its Chapter 11 petition
MBFA owed Huffman a total of $119,005 on the two notes.91
Both the bankruptcy judge and the district court found that
Huffman was an insider of the debtor under section 101(25)(B)
of the Bankruptcy Code,92 and they ordered his claims subordi-
nated to those of general unsecured creditors under section
510(c)(1).9 3 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the finding that Huffman
was an insider of MBFA, but reversed the subordination of
Huffman's claims. The court remanded the issue to the bank-
ruptcy court for further enunciation of its findings under the
Mobile Steel test, particularly on the issue of inequitable con-
duct. Once again, the predominant consideration was whether
the trustee's objection to Huffman's claims was supported by a
substantial factual basis or whether it was merely formal.
9 4
90. For discussion of the ramifications of a claim for equitable subordination in a
Chapter 11 case, see Cohn, Subordinated Claims: Their Classification and Voting
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293 (1982); Given &
Philipps, Equality in the Eye of the Beholder-Classification of Claims and Interests in
Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 735 (1982).
91. 712 F.2d at 209.
92. 11 U.S.C. § 101(28)(B) (Supp. II 1984).
93. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (Supp. II 1984).
94. 712 F.2d at 212-13. See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
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In 1980 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the North-
ern District of Georgia decided In re Carolee's Combine, Inc. 5
Carolee's Combine, Inc. was a corporation organized by Carolee
W. Davies for the purpose of acquiring, restoring, and auctioning
antique architectural merchandise. Davies, the sole officer and
shareholder of Carolee's Combine, contributed little capital to
the corporation; she obtained the money necessary for purchas-
ing, transporting, and refinishing the antique inventory through
an innovative fund-raising technique.
To each person who advanced cash to the corporation,
Carolee's issued a "Promissory Note" and a "Finder's Fee" let-
ter. Under the terms of the note Carolee's would return the prin-
cipal advanced plus ten percent annual interest to the "lender"
on the first day of the scheduled two-day auction. The "Finder's
Fee" letter entitled the holder to a flat ten percent of the princi-
pal amount of the advance as a bonus payable at the same
time. 8 When the auction lost $195,570.93, Carolee's paid
$313,764.32 to the individuals who had advanced cash, while the
general creditors received nothing. 7 At issue in the case was the
paymaent made to Jay Core, one of Carolee's "lenders."
The trustee argued that Carolee's payment to Core was
based on an equity investment rather than a loan, that Core
should return the money to the debtor estate, and that Core's
claim should be subordinated to the claims of general unsecured
creditors. The court held that the trustee had met his burden of
proof under each of the three prongs of the Mobile Steel test.
According to the court, Core's conduct, as well as that of the
other investors, was inequitable both because it shifted the risk
of loss to the general creditors and because it created a secret
first lien on the debtor's assets.98 In addition, under state corpo-
rate law the interests of the persons who advanced money to
Carolee's were "shares," and "one cannot withdraw capital from
a corporation without first arranging for the payment of its valid
debts."9
The trustee was, therefore, able to recover the money paid
95. 3 Bankr. 324 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
96. Id. at 326.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 327-28.
99. Id. at 328.
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to Core because it was a transfer voidable under state law and
because Core's claim was properly subordinated to the claims of
unsecured creditors. The court noted that "the fact that the de-
fendant was paid does not prevent this Court from subordinat-
ing his claim against the bankrupt, and, as a necessary corollary
to that subordination, requiring him to return that which he has
received."100
B. Claims Subordinated
As noted above, one claim in In re Multiponics, Inc.101
prompted the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to exercise its
power of equitable subordination. Carl Biehl, a director of Mul-
tiponics, Inc., claimed that the debtor corporation owed him a
total of $1,212,500. Biehl had previously paid two creditors as
personal guarantor of Multiponics' debts to them; in return the
two creditors assigned their claims against Multiponics to
Biehl.'02
The court distinguished Multiponics from Mobile Steel and
found that the trustee in Multiponics had met his burden of
overcoming Biehl's facially valid proof of claim by providing
substantial material facts pointing to the inequitable nature of
Biehl's conduct.10 3 The burden, thus, shifted to Biehl to show
the fairness and good faith of his transactions with Multiponics.
In applying the first part of the Mobile Steel test, the court
held that Biehl failed to prove that his conduct was not inequi-
table. As a director of Multiponics, Biehl authorized and partici-
pated in several transactions that involved self-dealing and vio-
lated Multiponics' debenture agreement.10 4 Further, the court
held that Multiponics was severely undercapitalized under both
tests set forth in Mobile Steel: the testimony of financial experts
indicated that the capital structure of Multiponics was insuffi-
cient at all relevant times, and Multiponics would not have been
able to obtain loans from informed outside sources based on its
balance sheet. The majority of its financing was obtained only
100. Id. at 327.
101. 622 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980). See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
102. Id. at 713. These two claims were for $1,000,000 and $212,500.
103. Id. at 714-15.
104. Id. at 715-16.
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through the personal guarantees of its directors.105
Biehl, citing the second prong of the Mobile Steel test, ar-
gued that his conduct did not result in actual injury to Multi-
ponics and that the court should therefore refuse to subordinate
his claim. The Multiponics court indicated that Biehl had mis-
interpreted the test and that the crucial issue was injury to the
corporation's creditors rather than to the bankrupt corporation
itself.10 8 By causing a violation of the debenture agreement and
acquiescing in an inaccurate valuation of Multiponics' assets,
Biehl had damaged both the debenture holders and the lenders.
As the court noted,'0 7 Biehl failed to address the other side of
the test-unfair advantage to the claimant.
The Multiponics court also determined that, under the
third prong of the Mobile Steel test, subordination of Biehl's
claim would be consistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code. After stressing the equitable nature of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings and considering all the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding Biehl's conduct, the court concluded that "where inge-
nuity spawns unprecedented vagaries of unfairness, we should
not decline to recognize their marks, nor hesitate to turn the
twilight for Biehl into a new dawn for other creditors."'' 08
As noted above, the Fifth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy
court's subordination order and the district court in In re Mis-
sionary Baptist Foundation of America, Inc. 0 9 Unfortunately
for the claimant, remand did not cause the bankruptcy court to
look upon him with greater favor; his claim was again subordi-
nated. 10 The court found that Huffman had not himself com-
mitted any overt acts of misconduct, but was merely the benefi-
ciary of Wall's actions."' This finding, however, was not enough
to protect Huffman: "[I]t is clear that Wall dealt with MBFA as
his mere instrumentality or alter ego . . . [and] that he
breached the fiduciary relationship . . . in his self dealing with
the debtor and its affiliates.""' The court also imputed Wall's
105. Id. at 718-20.
106. Id. at 720-21.
107. Id. at 721 n. 11.
108. Id. at 722.
109. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
110. 48 Bankr. 885 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985).
111. Id. at 888.
112. Id. at 889.
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inequitable conduct in two transactions to Huffman.113 The
notes MBFA had given to Wall and Huffman were paid without
fail, while numerous other creditors received nothing. Thus, the
court concluded, the "concept of fair and equitable distribution
was violated . . . [and] equitable subordination of the claim is
not inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code."'
1 14
V. MOBILE STEEL: BEYOND THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Mobile Steel has been warmly received in other circuits. It
has been cited with approval or explicitly adopted by courts in
every circuit except the Fourth, which, as of this writing, has no
reported decisions on the issue of equitable subordination. More
significantly, no court has rejected the essential thrust of the
Mobile Steel analysis. This section will examine the equitable
subordination cases from other circuits, which will again be clas-
sified, where appropriate, according to whether or not the court
decided to subordinate the claim in question.
A. D.C. Circuit
In 1982 a bankruptcy court subordinated a claim in Reiner
v. Washington Plate Glass Co.'1 5 Reiner was the president and
sole shareholder of Washington Plate Glass Co. (WPG) from its
creation until 1971, when he transferred one-half of his stock to
WPG's sales manager. Six years later, in a transaction character-
ized by the court as "not fraudulent nor in anticipation of bank-
ruptcy,"' 16 Reiner sold his remaining interest in WPG to the
corporation and received in exchange a note secured by WPG's
assets. The company made regular payments on the note until
1980, when WPG defaulted and ceased business operations.
WPG filed its voluntary petition for relief under the Bankruptcy
Code in 1981.
The court held that WPG's promise to pay Reiner was nec-
essarily conditioned on the company's ability to pay without
jeopardizing capital or the interests of other creditors and that
113. The court held that Huffman could be regarded as an insider only in connec-
tion with two of the transactions involving Wall. Id.
114. Id. at 890.
115. 27 Bankr. 550 (D.D.C. 1982).
116. Id. at 551.
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allowance of Reiner's claim as secured would be "manifestly un-
fair to the company's general unsecured creditors."11 7 The court,
therefore, required that Reiner show a benefit to the company
from the sale of stock in order to satisfy the Pepper v. Litton
"inherent fairness" test."8 Reiner failed to meet his burden.
The court, citing Multiponics,"9 Mobile Steel, and In re
Westgate-California Corp.,'2" concluded that enforcement of
Reiner's security interest would prejudice other creditors and
that "[e]quitable subordination under the circumstances of this
case is also consistent with the [1978 Code's] fundamental pur-
pose of preserving the bankrupt's assets for the benefit of
creditors."''1
B. First Circuit
1. Claims Not Subordinated
In 1983 a Massachusetts bankruptcy court reluctantly de-
nied a trustee's request for equitable subordination of an Inter-
nal Revenue Service claim in In re Bellucci. 22 Bellucci, a former
practicing attorney, had misappropriated approximately
$500,000 of clients' funds. After those clients placed the debtor
in an involuntary Chapter 7 proceeding, the IRS filed its sub-
stantial claim for unpaid taxes and interest. When it became ap-
parent that liquidation of the debtor's assets would produce a
sum insufficient to satisfy even the tax claim in full, the Chapter
7 trustee applied to the court for subordination of the IRS claim
to the claims of the defrauded clients. The bankruptcy court,
117. Id. at 552.
118. 308 U.S. 295 (1939). See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
120. 642 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1981). See infra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
The district court arguably misinterpreted Westgate since that case made no mention of
any requirement that subordination be consistent with the Bankruptcy Code.
121. 27 Bankr. at 552. This language may form a basis for attacking the result in In
re Dade County Dairies, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 438 (S.D. Fla. 1979). See supra notes 63-66
and accompanying text. Arguably, mechanical enforcement of an administrative priority,
when it is shown that the claimant has engaged in inequitable conduct to the detriment
of creditors or the debtor, violates the fundamental purposes of the Code and, thus, is
inconsistent with it. Furthermore, it is hardly conceivable that Congress intended the
administrative priority to be a vehicle for the exploitation of creditors and the debtor.
122. 24 Bankr. 493 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982), aff'd, 29 Bankr. 814 (Bankr. App. 1st
Cir. 1983).
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applying the Mobile Steel test, concluded that subordination
was not justified. The court determined that since the IRS had
not engaged in any inequitable conduct, its claim must enjoy the
statutory priority specifically provided by the Bankruptcy
Code. 123 The bankruptcy appellate panel, affirming the lower
court's holding, described Mobile Steel as "controlling law,
'124
but cited no First Circuit decision expressly adopting the test.
2. Claims Subordinated
In In re Formaggio Manufacturing, Inc.,125 a Rhode Island
bankruptcy court held that an insider's claim should be subordi-
nated. Ralph Grasso, the claimant in that case, had organized
the debtor corporation in April 1978. In July of the same year an
entry was made in the corporate books to reflect Grasso's in-
debtedness to the corporation for approximately $74,000. In
September 1979,126 Grasso issued two checks to himself: one for
$34,083 for "past-due wages" and one for $15,000 for "past-due
rent" on property owned by Grasso and occupied by the corpo-
rate operation. Grasso then endorsed the checks back to the cor-
poration. The debtor's books reflected neither obligation, and
Grasso conceded that the sole purpose of this "transparent ac-
counting sleight of hand ' 127 was to reduce his obligation to the
corporation. The court found the transactions voidable as pref-
erential and fraudulent transfers. The court also concluded that
all three prongs of the Mobile Steel test had been satisfied and
subordinated any further claims Grasso might have against the
corporation to the claims of unsecured creditors.2 8
In 1985 a Massachusetts bankruptcy court relied on Mobile
Steel to subordinate a claim in In re Beverages International
Ltd. 2e The debtor corporation (BIL) was a liquor distributor
that was wholly owned by members of the Cicerchia family until
123. See 24 Bankr. at 496-97.
124. 29 Bankr. at 815.
125. 23 Bankr. 688 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1982).
126. The checks were issued less than one month prior to filing. The corporate
books were adjusted on July 1, 1979. Id. at 689.
127. 23 Bankr. at 690. This description is, of course, the court's rather than
Grasso's.
128. The court merely recited the Mobile Steel test and held, without further dis-
cussion, that all necessary factors were present. Id. at 692.
129. 50 Bankr. 273 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
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April 1982. At that time Richard Gordon, then vice-president
and later president of M. H. Gordon & Sons (MHG), purchased
one-third of the outstanding stock in BIL. Part of the considera-
tion was an unsecured, interest-free $250,000 loan that Gordon
made to the debtor. Gordon reimbursed himself with money
from MHG and executed a promissory note to MHG containing
the same terms as the note from BIL to hin The agreement
also obligated BIL to purchase inventory from MHG. Two weeks
after the closing BIL paid MHG $180,000 for inventory that was
largely unsellable. MHG later failed to transfer to BIL some of
its distribution lines as it had promised to do.1"'
In December 1982 Gordon and his father persuaded the
Cicerchias that BIL should purchase Narragansett Sales from
the Gordons. The purchase price was $24,000 plus a capital con-
tribution of $28,000 from each of BIL's three shareholders,
Gordon and two of the Cicerchias. As part of the purchase, BIL
assumed a lease on property owned by an entity controlled by
the Gordons and bought computer equipment from Gordon's fa-
ther for $25,000. In addition to documents relating to the De-
cember transactions, BIL also executed a security agreement
covering the April loan.
13
1
When BIL filed for bankruptcy, MHG asserted a claim for
$250,000 against the debtor corporation, based on Gordon's
purchase of BIL stock. The court found that the first prong of
the Mobile Steel test was satisfied because of the following ineq-
uitable conduct: MHG's sale of defective inventory to BIL, its
failure to transfer distribution lines, the delay between the loan
from Gordon and the execution of the security agreement cover-
ing the loan, the presentation of the security agreement in the
sale of Narragansett and other Gordon assets to the debtor at a
time when the debtor was ill-equipped to make the purchase,
and the use of BIL's employees at Gordon's facilities while they
were being paid by BIL.13 2 The court determined that these acts
resulted in the depletion of BIL's assets and the enrichment of
MHG at BIL's expense. The court also found that MHG's con-
duct satisfied the second and third prongs of the Mobile Steel
test: BIL's other creditors had suffered injury, and subordina-
130. Id. at 278.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 283.
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tion would not be inconsistent with bankruptcy principles be-
cause MHG "would not have had a secured claim in the absence
of its affiliation with and domination of the debtor.
'133
In In re Labelle Industries, Inc.,3 a Rhode Island bank-
ruptcy court cited Mobile Steel several times in setting aside a
creditor's claim as a contribution to capital, but omitted any
consideration of the test's third prong-that the subordination
be consistent with the Bankruptcy Code. John Hogan was the
president and sole shareholder of Comet Dye Works, the credi-
tor. In 1978 Hogan began to liquidate Comet, and his son
Michael, who had been an employee of Comet, created the
debtor corporation, Labelle, to manufacture waterbeds. Michael
owned fifty-five percent of Labelle and was its president; his fa-
ther and mother owned the other forty-five percent. In 1979
Comet ceased operating as a textile dyeing concern and became
involved exclusively in purchasing waterbed manufacturing
equipment and leasing it to Labelle. Although the leases con-
tained specific terms for payment and repossession in the event
of default, no payments were ever made, and Comet never at-
tempted to repossess the equipment until after the bankruptcy
petition was filed. 135
Upon objections to Comet's motion for relief from the auto-
matic stay, the court found that "[t]he 'leases' were utilized in
an attempt to provide assets to their son's business, without the
risks normally attendant to insider contributions."'16 Thus,
"[T]he transactions 'resulted in injury to the creditors . ..or
conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant.' "137
C. Second Circuit
1. Claims Not Subordinated
In In re Castillo38 the bankruptcy trustee attempted to set
aside the debtors' conveyance of their residence to the mortga-
gee. The conveyance was made in lieu of foreclosure. The mort-
133. Id. at 284.
134. 44 Bankr. 760 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1984).
135. Id. at 761.
136. Id. at 762.
137. Id. at 763 (quoting Mobile Steel, 363 F.2d at 700).
138. 7 Bankr. 135 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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gagee took possession of the property on January 26, 1980, and
perfected his interest on April 11, 1980. The debtors then filed a
voluntary Chapter 7 petition on July 25, 1980.139 The New York
bankruptcy court dismissed the trustee's complaint for failure to
state a cause of action because the conveyance to the noninsider
mortgagee occurred more than ninety days prior to the filing of
the petition and was, thus, not preferential. The complaint addi-
tionally failed to set forth elements necessary to support a claim
for fraudulent conveyance. Finally, the trustee failed to allege
inequitable conduct by the mortgagee sufficient to satisfy the
first prong of the Mobile Steel test.4 °
A request for subordination was also denied in In re Tel-
tronics Services, Inc.4 1 In that case a New York bankruptcy
court adopted the Mobile Steel test as well as the three guiding
principles enumerated in that case. 42 The court divided the par-
ties whose claims might be subordinated into two classes: insid-
ers and noninsiders. The court determined that "[t]he primary
distinctions between subordinating the claims of insiders versus
those of non-insiders lie in the severity of misconduct required
to be shown, and the degree to which the court will scrutinize
the claimant's actions toward the debtor or its creditors.' 14 The
court found that when the claimant is a noninsider, egregious
conduct must be proven with particularity.1
4
While a creditor is ordinarily not a fiduciary of the debtor,
he may become one if he attempts to interfere in the debtor's
139. Id. at 136.
140. Id. at 138. See also In re Lion Capital Group, 49 Bankr. 163, 179 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985)(rejecting subordination because there was no fraud or other inequitable
conduct and no unfair advantage).
141. 29 Bankr. 139 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
142. The court stated:
First, the inequitable conduct of the claimant need not have been related to
the acquisition or assertion of his claim. . . .The inequity 'may equally arise
out of any unfair act'. . . which affects the bankruptcy results to other credi-
tors .... Second, since equitable relief is by its very nature remedial rather
than penal, a claim should be equitably subordinated only to the extent neces-
sary to offset the harm suffered by the debtor and its creditors as a result of
the inequitable conduct .... Finally, the burden of proving all the elements
of subordination is on the objectant.
Id. at 168.
143. Id. at 169 (citing 4 Bankr. 53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 20 Bankr. 186
(S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1983)).
144. 29 Bankr. at 169.
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business to an extent not justified by a reasonable desire to pro-
tect his interests. 145 The Teltronics court, summarizing prior
case law on the showing necessary to subordinate a noninsider
creditor's claim, stated that "a non-insider will be held to a fidu-
ciary standard only where his ability to command the debtor's
obedience to his policy directives is so overwhelming that there
has been, to some extent, a merger of identity.146 Teltronics,
thus, created three classes of parties whose claims may be subor-
dinated: insiders, creditors with such control over the debtor
that they are held to the same standards as insiders, and credi-
tors lacking such control. To persuade the court to subordinate
the claims of a creditor without control, the trustee must "prove
that the claimant is guilty of gross misconduct tantamount to
'fraud, overreaching or spoliation to the detriment of others.' -147
If the objectant can establish such behavior, he need not show
control by the noninsider. 48
Applying this analysis to the facts before it, the court first
found that the creditor, LMU, had no direct control over the
debtor because it owned no stock in the debtor, shared no com-
mon officers or directors with the debtor, and had no contractual
right to participate in the management of the debtor. Second,
the court determined that the following facts were insufficient to
establish "undue entanglement with the bankrupt's opera-
tions": 14 9 (1) that the debtor was required to purchase certain
quantities of equipment from the creditor and to limit addi-
tional outside secured financing to a preset level under the terms
of the loan agreements; (2) that the creditor eventually placed
145. See Bartlett & Lapatin, The Status of a Creditor as a 'Controlling Person,' 28
MERCER L. REv. 639 (1977); Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting From Im-
proper Interference with the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus.
LAW. 343 (1975). For pre-Mobile Steel applications of this principle, see In re Prima, 98
F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1938); In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill.
1964), rev'd on other grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966). See also In re W. T. Grant
Co., 699 F.2d 599, 610 (2d Cir. 1983)("[A]part from [voidable preferences and fraudulent
conveyances] there is generally no objection to a creditor's using his bargaining position,
including his ability to refuse to make further loans needed by the debtor, to improve
the status of his existing claims."); In re American Lumber Co., 5 Bankr. 470 (D. Minn.
1980).
146. 29 Bankr. at 171.
147. Id. at 169 (quoting In re W. T. Grant Co., 4 Bankr. 53, 75 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983)).
148. See id. at 172.
149. Id.
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the debtor on C.O.D. payment terms; (3) that the creditor re-
fused to provide additional guaranteed financing; and (4) that
the creditor carefully monitored the debtor's financial position
and made recommendations regarding future actions by the
debtor.150 Finally, the court held that the creditor did not engage
in sufficiently egregious conduct to warrant subordination of its
claim. Specifically, the court found that a document the trustee
described as "a blueprint for LMU's takeover scheme" was
largely an exploration of "alternative courses of action in the
event of a default.' 15' The court also applied this benign
description to the creditor's proposal to compete against the
debtor in the debtor's marketing area because the creditor delib-
erately avoided soliciting the debtor's former employees or cus-
tomers. The court found no evidence that the creditor had
fraudulently induced the debtor to take certain actions by prom-
ising to make a loan and expressed doubt that this had in fact
occurred:
[S]ince the alleged sanctions employed by LMU ... are more
directly attributable to Teltronics' large trade account balance,
... it appears that LMU's equity negotiations were not the
cause of damage sustained by Teltronics' other creditors. Ac-
cordingly, pursuant to the Mobile Steel test, the alleged ineq-
uitable conduct is an insufficient predicate for invoking the
harsh remedy of equitable subordination.
52
In In re Roamer Linen Supply, Inc.,153 a New York bank-
ruptcy court rebuffed the efforts of two debtors-in-possession to
subordinate the secured claims by the IRS and a bank to admin-
istrative bankruptcy expenses. The claimed expenses were com-
posed largely of past and projected legal fees owed to the debt-
ors' attorney. The debtors argued that the IRS and the bank
should have sought a foreclosure or objected to the particular
sale of the assets involved, but the court summarily rejected this
contention:
Having successfully sought the authority to continue to
use Bank Leumi's cash collateral in order to be in a position to
150. Id.
151. Id. at 173.
152. Id. at 174.
153. 30 Bankr. 932 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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structure a negotiated sale of assets, the debtors can not now
be heard to argue that Bank Leumi and the IRS should be sub-
ordinated to all of the administration expenses in this case, in-
cluding the debtors' attorneys' fees because these secured
claimholders did not sufficiently resist the debtors' sale strat-
egy. Neither Bank Leumi nor the IRS ever engaged in any in-
equitable conduct in this case so as to trigger the equitable
subordination doctrine set forth in Code section 510(c)(1).
54
2. Claims Subordinated
In In re Lockwood,155 a New York bankruptcy court relied
heavily on In re Westgate-California Corp.156 to subordinate the
claim of a judgment creditor who had filed a motion for relief
from the automatic stay. The plaintiff claimant had obtained a
default judgment against the debtors in state court after the de-
fendant debtors answer was stricken for failure to comply with a
discovery order. The bankruptcy court, however, found that the
default resulted from the "gross incompetence" of the debtors'
attorney, who had received the requested papers from the
debtor defendants, but had failed to deliver them to the plain-
tiff. The bankruptcy court held that the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel are inapplicable "where equitable princi-
ples require reexamination. . . of a claim that has been reduced
to judgment. '1 57 The court further explained that "a judgment
offered as a claim against the estate could be collaterally at-
tacked 'for the purpose of showing that it was obtained by collu-
sion . . . or is founded upon no real debt.' 11,8
Upon examination, the court determined that the plaintiff's
claim was meritless because the debt owed the plaintiff was a
debt of a corporation wholly owned by one of the debtors and
the debtors had not personally guaranteed the debt. Thus, the
court reasoned, the plaintiff's claim, if any, was solely against
the corporation and not against the individuals in bankruptcy.
59
154. Id. at 937.
155. 14 Bankr. 374 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
156. 642 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1981). See infra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
157. 14 Bankr. at 378.
158. Id. (quoting Margolis v. Nazareth Fair Grounds & Farmers Market, 249 F.2d
221, 223-24 (2d Cir. 1957))(emphasis added by court).
159. 14 Bankr. at 380.
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Furthermore, the trustee, not the debtor, was seeking to
subordinate the plaintiff's claim, and the trustee, not being a
party to the disputed judgment, had not had an opportunity to
litigate the merits of the claim.1 60 The court found that the
plaintiff had engaged in conduct injurious to the debtors' other
creditors by obtaining a judgment when it had no claim against
the debtor: "Through its misconduct, the Plaintiff has obtained
a judgment lien giving it a secured position against the real
property of the debtors, an asset that would otherwise be availa-
ble to satisfy the claims of other [true] creditors. ' '1 6' Therefore,
the court subordinated the plaintiff's claim.
Lockwood is noteworthy in two respects. First, it cited Mo-
bile Steel's three-pronged test, but never applied the third
prong. 62 Second, and more significantly, unless the creditor's
conduct in Lockwood can be described as egregious, the continu-
ing validity of this case is questionable in view of the Second
Circuit's decision in Teltronics,63 which was issued two years
later by the same bankruptcy court that decided Lockwood.
In re McFarlin's, Inc.16 4 involved a claim based on a lease
executed between the debtor and a partnership composed of
three of the debtor's four officers. In 1981 the officers of McFar-
lin's, a clothing retailer, decided to open a new store, and the
chosen location required about $75,000 of improvements. When
the bank refused financing, three of the four officers formed a
partnership, F.G. & G., and obtained the loan through the part-
nership by making personal guaranties. F.G. & G. used the
loan's proceeds to purchase the necessary improvements, and
then leased the improvements to McFarlin's under a five-year
lease at $3,000 per month.6 5 The net result of this arrangement
was that McFarlin's was obligated to pay $180,000 for improve-
ments that it could have purchased for $120,000 if the officers
had personally guaranteed a loan to the corporation. In addition,
160. Id. at 381.
161. Id.
162. Several other Second Circuit decisions have also cited Mobile Steel and ignored
the third prong of the test. See In re Colin, 44 Bankr. 806 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re
Micro-Acoustics Corp., 34 Bankr. 279 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Featherworks Corp.,
25 Bankr. 634 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
163. See supra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
164. 49 Bankr. 550 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985).
165. Id. at 552-53.
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at the end of the five-year lease period McFarlin's would have
had no equity in the improvements and no option to purchase
them. The three partners, however, would have made a $60,000
profit at McFarlin's expense. The partners also testified that at
the expiration of the five-year period they intended to renew the
lease, thus reaping still more profits at the debtor's expense.166
The New York bankruptcy court, applying the Mobile Steel
test, found the lease arrangement "inequitable," "outrageous,"
and "unconscionable ' 167 and subordinated all F.G. & G.'s claims.
The court also found damage to the debtor because, even if F.G.
& G. would have transferred title to the improvements at the
end of the lease's term, the effective annual interest rate of this
"loan" would have been 42.36%. In addition, the court con-
cluded that the arrangement had harmed the debtor's other
creditors because even though McFarlin's accumulated over
$950,000 in prepetition debt, it faithfully paid rent under the
lease up to the day it filed its Chapter 11 petition.168
The court also subordinated F.G. & G.'s claim for rent due
to the real property lessor, who had assigned his administrative
rent claim to F.G. & G. Contrary to Dade County Dairies,1 69 the
court had no difficulty in deciding that the claim's status as an
administrative expense did not bar its subordination:
Where insiders have injured the debtor, preferred themselves
over the other creditors, and created an unfair bargain, the
principles of fairness would be violated if the insiders' claim
was allowed to share equally with the other creditors ...
[T]here does not appear to be any inconsistency with the Code
in subordinating F.G. & G.'s claims.170
In In re Tampa Chain Co.,17 1 a New York bankruptcy court
analogized equitable subordination to piercing the corporate
veil. The trustee in that case sought a marshaling order requir-
ing a secured creditor to proceed first against the guarantors and
their supporting co-op before proceeding against the debtor es-
tate. He was opposed by both the secured creditor and the
166. Id. at 554-55.
167. Id. at 555.
168. Id. at 552.
169. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text, note 121.
170. 49 Bankr. at 555-56.
171. 53 Bankr. 772 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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shareholder-guarantors of the debt. The court first noted that
marshaling traditionally required ownership of assets by a com-
mon debtor and that "[o]rdinarily this requirement is not met
where the two funds sought to be marshaled are held separately
by a corporation and its shareholder. ' 17 2 The court found, how-
ever, that marshaling is appropriate in cases of inequitable con-
duct by insiders:
Finding a common debtor has the effect of first liquidating
the collateral posted by the corporate principals and requiring
them to share equally with or be subordinated to other credi-
tors upon subrogation.. . . Here, the elements of inequitable
conduct and fraud justifying disregard of the corporate veil or
requiring equitable subordination are clearly present. While
corporate formalities and records are evidenced, they show
continuous use of Tampa Chain as a personal piggy bank from
which the Reichards withdrew much of Tampa's initial capital-
ization, replenished it through depositing Wolf Reichard's own
funds, and from which he transferred some $770,000.00 in in-
ventory to another family owned company on hardly commer-
cial terms. This is hardly a case of business acumen. It is a case
of abuse of corporate funds. 17 3
Thus, the court would apparently subordinate any subrogated
claim of the debtor's principals arising from the marshaling pro-
cedure, if consistent with the Mobile Steel guidelines.
D. Third Circuit
1. Claims Not Subordinated
Courts in the Third Circuit have applied Mobile Steel on
three occasions. In In re Omega Lithographers, Inc.,7 4 a Penn-
sylvania bankruptcy court refused to subordinate a claim based
on a loan to the bankrupt by its director and sole shareholder.
The court first stated that a claim would not be subordinated
solely because its holder, as a director or officer, made a loan to
the corporation. Such a per se subordination "would discourage
those most interested in the corporation from attempting to sal-
172. Id. at 778.
173. Id. at 779.
174. 17 Bankr. 753 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982).
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vage it through the infusion of capital. ' 175 The burden was, thus,
on the movant creditor to justify subordination, and the creditor
showed neither injury to the debtor or the creditor nor an unfair
advantage to the claimant.
A more significant case was In re Ludwig Honold Manufac-
turing Co.,176 in which a district court adopted both the Mobile
Steel test and the Teltronics application of that test to nonin-
sider creditors. 177 The adoption of Teltronics, however, may be
characterized as dicta since the court ultimately concluded that
"under either the fiduciary or non-fiduciary standard the [claim-
ant has not] engaged in [any] inequitable conduct sufficient to
warrant subordination." 7 8 The court found the following factors
insufficient to warrant subordination: that the creditor claimant
monitored the debtor's financial condition on an almost daily
basis, that the creditor made various suggestions to the debtor
about its business operations, that the creditor threatened to de-
clare the loan in default when the debtor failed to effect reme-
dial business measures, and that the debtor's sole shareholder
often used the debtor's assets to satisfy the debt because he had
personally guaranteed the loan. The court noted that
"[n]otwithstanding the close watch by [the creditor bank] and
its suggestions to the debtor about its business operations, [the
bank] did not overbear the will of the debtor or become its alter
ego.,,2179
2. Claims Subordinated
A bankruptcy court did subordinate a creditor's claim for
insider misfeasance in In re Americana Apparel, Inc.1 80 In that
case the debtor corporation executed a preincorporation agree-
ment stipulating that it would enter into a consultation agree-
ment with Charles Gordon & Sons, Inc., the claimant in the
175. Id. at 754 (citing Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 701). The court's infelicitous use of
the expression "infusion of capital," which is also found in Mobile Steel, should be
avoided. The movant creditor might have been suprised to find out that an "infusion of
capital" is not necessarily a "capital contribution."
176. 46 Bankr. 125 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985).
177. See supra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
178. 46 Bankr. at 129.
179. Id. at 127.
180. 55 Bankr. 160 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985).
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bankruptcy proceeding. The same three individuals were officers
of both corporations, a situation the court characterized as "tan-
tamount to hiring oneself as a consultant."' 81 Further, the prein-
corporation agreement provided that the postincorporation con-
sultation contract would entitle Charles Gordon & Sons to a fee
of 3.5% of the debtor's gross receipts. No written contract was
ever executed, none of the participants could remember the
terms of any oral contract, and no evidence indicated that any
consultation services were ever provided to the debtor qua cor-
poration. In addition, the liability for "services" was never re-
flected on any financial statement of the debtor, the claimant
never recorded the receivable amounts in its books, and the debt
was never included in the debtor's schedules, disclosure state-
ment, or proposed plan. In fact, the debt came to light only
when the claimant filed its proof of claim approximately two
years after the debtor filed its Chapter 11 petition. Under these
circumstances, the court had no difficulty determining that the
claim should be subordinated. 182
E. Sixth Circuit
1. Claims Not Subordinated
Despite the clear statement in Mobile Steel and numerous
other cases that neither a claimant's position of dominance nor
its insider status alone constitutes a sufficient ground for equita-
ble subordination, trustees and creditors seem unable to resist
the temptation to seek the remedy on these bases. This was the
case in In re All Products Co., 83 which apparently was the first
decision in the Sixth Circuit to adopt explicitly the Mobile Steel
test. The bankruptcy court, however, denied the creditors' mo-
tion to subordinate for failure to demonstrate that the claimant,
the debtor's parent corporation, had engaged in any inequitable
conduct.8'8
181. Id. at 163.
182. This court also cited all three prongs of the Mobile Steel test, but failed to
discuss the third prong. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
183. 32 Bankr. 811 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
184. Id. at 816.
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2. Claims Subordinated
A more complex set of facts led to subordination of a se-
cured claim in In re Pat Freeman, Inc.8 5 Two men, DeWitt and
Freeman, were the debtor's original shareholders. In 1980 plain-
tiff Loudin contracted with DeWitt and Freeman as individuals
to sell them his restaurant and the real estate on which it stood.
Although the purchase agreement required the buyers to execute
a financing statement and deliver it to the escrow agent, the
buyers failed to comply with this term. As a result, Loudin never
obtained a perfected security interest in the restaurant property.
The bill of sale transferred the restaurant's personal property to
three buyers: DeWitt, Freeman, and the debtor. In April 1981
DeWitt sold his interest to Freeman in exchange for, among
other things, a note secured by a financing statement covering
the debtor's personal property. This property consisted largely
of the trade fixtures obtained from Loudin. DeWitt also assigned
his interest in the land contract to Freeman, in violation of a
provision in the contract. The dispute came before the court
when the trustee proposed a sale of the trade fixtures, in which
both DeWitt and Loudin claimed security interests.186
The court first held that Loudin's claim was unsecured'87
and then turned to the question of subordination. After refer-
ring to the Mobile Steel test, the court rejected DeWitt's argu-
ment that equitable subordination applies only against claim-
ants with fiduciary duties: "The mere absence of a fiduciary,
standing alone, does not preclude application of the doctrine of
equitable subordination."1 s8 The court then subordinated the
claim:
It was clearly inequitable for DeWitt, given his contractual
duty to execute and deliver a financing statement on behalf of
Loudin, to gain secured status by filing his own statement. The
Court notes that if DeWitt had met his contractual obligations
in full, his secured claim would be secondary to Loudin's claim.
By contriving to obtain first priority on the collateral, DeWitt
was unfairly advantaged and this Court cannot countenance
185. 42 Bankr. 224 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).
186. Id. at 227.
187. Id. at 229.
188. Id. at 231.
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such misconduct as a court of equity.'89
Having found that the first two parts of the test were met,
the court then apparently placed on DeWitt the burden of prov-
ing inconsistency with the Bankruptcy Code.9 0 It does not ap-
pear from the opinion that DeWitt cited Teltronics'9' or its
progeny to argue that a nonfiduciary must be guilty of particu-
larly egregious conduct before a court is justified in subordinat-
ing his claim. In fact, nothing in the opinion even hints at a dif-
ferent standard for nonfiduciaries.
F. Seventh Circuit
1. Claims Not Subordinated
In In re Wilnor Drilling, Inc.,92 an Illinois district court re-
versed a bankruptcy court's order subordinating the expenses
and fees of the Official Investors' Committee to those of the Offi-
cial Creditors' Committee. 93 The bankruptcy court had appar-
ently ordered the fees and expenses of the Investors' Committee
equitably subordinated to those of the Creditors' Committee be-
cause the Investors' Committee was discretionary, while the
Creditors' Committee was statutorily mandated."9
The district court found this distinction irrelevant and held
that subordination would not be allowed unless the facts satis-
fied all three prongs of the Mobile Steel test:
The Investors' Committee claim to reasonable fees and ex-
penses is not fraudulently represented through bad faith or in-
equitable conduct. Similarly, the Investors' Committee did not
engage in any conduct which caused harm or injury to the
189. Id.
190. "DeWitt has not shown the Court how application of this doctrine of equitable
subordination in this case would be inconsistent with any other provision of the Code."
Id.
191. See supra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
192. 29 Bankr. 727 (S.D. Ill. 1982).
193. The Creditors' Committee was formed pursuant to the mandate of 11 U.S.C. §
1102(a)(1) (1982). The court created the Investors' Committee upon motion of the S.E.C.
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1102(a)(2) (1982), which provides: "On request of a party in inter-
est, the court may order the appointment of additional committees of creditors or of
equity security holders if necessary to assure adequate representation of creditors or of
equity security holders."
194. 29 Bankr. at 731.
1986]
37
Nyzio: Mobile Steel and Beyond: Trends in Equitable Subordination
Published by Scholar Commons, 1986
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
debtors or other creditors, rendering to them an unfair advan-
tage. Finally, the Bankruptcy Code does not contain any ex-
press or implicit authority to subordinate the fees and ex-
penses of a mandatory committee to the fees and expenses of a
discretionary committee. In fact, the Bankruptcy Code does
not differentiate between the two types of committees in any
respect. Thus, the Bankruptcy Court had no authority to
subordinate the Investors' Committee's fees and expenses. 195
The Wilnor opinion is notable for its attempt to apply the
third prong of the Mobile Steel test-consistency with the pro-
visions of the Bankruptcy Code. As noted elsewhere, many
courts purporting to apply the Mobile Steel test have ignored
this requirement altogether. It is possible, however, that the dis-
trict court would have subordinated the claim for fees and ex-
penses if the Investors' Committee had engaged in inequitable
conduct that caused harm to the debtor or other creditors.
In re Osborne, ee a Wisconsin opinion, provides a useful
synthesis of Teltronics9 7 and Mobile Steel. The Osborne court,
considering an application for subordination of an insider's
claim, stated: "[O]nce an objectant. . . supports allegations of
impropriety with a substantial factual showing, the burden
shifts to the insider creditor to prove the good faith and inher-
ent fairness of its actions. 1 98 In contrast, the court asserted that
if the creditor is not an insider, the burden remains on the ob-
jectant throughout the proceedings. 199 The court noted that
while subordination generally requires that noninsiders be guilty
of some egregiously wrongful conduct,20 0 "the distinction be-
tween 'inequitable conduct' and 'gross misconduct' (possibly in-
volving 'moral turpitude') would seem to be a difficult one to
draw in practice. There are few cases in which the gross miscon-
duct standard has actually been applied."2 01 Finally, the court
195. Id. at 730-31. See 11 U.S.C. § 703 (1982).
196. 42 Bankr. 988 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
197. See supra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
198. 42 Bankr. at 996 (citing Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 701-02).
199. Id. (citing Teltronics, 29 Bankr. at 169).
200. "The degree of misconduct... has been variously described as very substan-
tial misconduct involving 'moral turpitude' or some breach of duty or some misrepresen-
tation whereby other creditors were deceived to their damage or as gross misconduct
amounting to fraud, overreaching, or spoliation." Id. (citations omitted).
201. Id.
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observed that if a creditor both possessed and exerted sufficient
control over the debtor, to the detriment of other creditors, he
would be treated as an insider. This control, however, must be
"virtually complete. ' 20 2
In Osborne the bankruptcy judge had found that PCA, the
claimant, had a relationship with the Osbornes that "'ap-
proach[ed] the status of a joint venture' and that the three cred-
itor applicants 'looked to PCA for payment of Osborne's ac-
counts.' ",203 In addition, after August 1981, when the loan was
renewed and increased, PCA controlled the loan2 04 and, on at
least one occasion, told the Osbornes how the funds were to be
spent. The district court concluded: "Undoubtedly . . ., [the
claimant] had considerable power over the Osbornes. But the
record contains no more than isolated examples of the exercise
of that power. ' 20 5 Thus, the court required that a creditor show
gross misconduct by the claimant before ordering a claim subor-
dinated. The court found PCA guilty of no such misfeasance to-
ward two of the creditor applicants and declined to subordinate
PCA's claim to theirs. PCA's requests for the bank to "go along"
with the Osbornes and the claimant's prepetition promise to an-
other creditor to "see to it" that the Osbornes' accounts were
paid regularly were held insufficient to establish a guarantee on
which the other creditors relied to their detriment.20 6
2. Claims Subordinated
In In re Osborne,207 the court did order that the claim be
subordinated to that of a third creditor, General Feeds, Inc.
PCA induced General to continue delivering feed to the debtor
through "equivocation and outright misrepresentations concern-
ing forthcoming payment. '20 8 Citing a Tennessee bankruptcy de-
202. Id. at 997. See also Teltronics, 29 Bankr. at 170-71 (supra notes 141-52 and
accompanying text); Mercer Trucking, 16 Bankr. at 189-90 (supra notes 82-88 and ac-
companying text); In re American Lumber, 5 Bankr. 470, 478 (D. Minn. 1980)(infra
notes 215-19 and accompanying text).
203. 42 Bankr. at 997 (quoting the bankruptcy judge).
204. Id. at 990. "A controlled loan is a loan limited to specific items." Id.
205. Id. at 997.
206. Id. at 998-99.
207. 42 Bankr. 988 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
208. Id. at 999.
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cision, °9 the court held that "misrepresentation whereby other
creditors were deceived to their damage" satisfied the "gross
misconduct" standard.10
In In re Loop Hospital Partnership,21' another Illinois
bankruptcy court also ordered a creditor's claim subordinated.
The dispute concerned the priority of the claim by the law firm
of Joyce and Kubasiak (J&K) to whom the debtor had assigned
a beneficial interest in a land trust. Two banks also claimed an
interest under an identical assignment executed the day after
J&K's. J&K had represented the debtor during the negotiations
for the assignment to the banks. The court avoided deciding the
issue of priority under the U.C.C. and held that the Bankruptcy
Code justified subordination of J&K's assignment regardless of
its status under state law.21 2 The court found that J&K had en-
gaged in "inequitable conduct at best" by participating in the
debtor's negotiations with the banks and by accepting the as-
signment despite knowledge that the debtor would represent to
the banks that no assignments had been made.213 The court also
found obvious harm to the banks and no inconsistency with the
Bankruptcy Code. The decision neither discussed whether J&K
was an insider of the debtor nor delineated the standard of be-
havior to which J&K was held.
G. Eighth Circuit
1. Claims Not Subordinated
Several cases arising in the Eighth Circuit have expressed a
view shared by other courts and noted above: an objectant can-
not obtain subordination of a claim simply by relying on a credi-
209. In re Just for the Fun of It of Tenn., Inc., 7 Bankr. 166, 180 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1980)(general contractor's claim subordinated because he filed a "false, misleading and
invalid notice of completion" on which other creditors relied in extending funds to the
debtor).
210. 42 Bankr. at 1000. The court also followed Mobile Steel in limiting subordina-
tion "to the extent necessary to offset the harm which the bankrupt and its creditors
suffered on account of the inequitable conduct." Id. (citing Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at
701).
211. 50 Bankr. 565 (Bankr. N.D. II. 1985).
212. Id. at 570. The court strongly suggested, however, that Illinois precedent would
mandate priority for J&K's assignment. Id.
213. Id. at 569.
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tor's relationship to the debtor. Although insider status and con-
trol of the debtor may influence the nature and extent of
inequitable conduct that must be shown, they cannot replace in-
equitable conduct as the basis for ordering subordination of a
claim.214
2. Claims Subordinated
In re American Lumber Co.215 is one of the few cases in
which an outside creditor was found to have exercised sufficient
control over the debtor to be treated as an insider. The debtor
began operations in January 1975 by purchasing all the assets of
the old American Lumber Company with a $2.5 million loan
from the First National Bank of St. Paul (the Bank). The Bank
lent one million dollars to the Employees Stock Ownership
Trust (ESOT) of new American Lumber Co. (ALC), and ESOT
contributed the money to ALC in exchange for 92% of ALC's
outstanding shares. ESOT, in turn, pledged the shares to the
Bank as security for its loan. The Bank also made two additional
loans: one to ALC's officers, which they used to purchase the
remaining 8% of the corporation's shares, and one directly to
ALC. These two loans were secured by a pledge of all the ALC
stock, accounts, and contract rights and by a second mortgage
on real estate. Of the $2.5 million ALC had paid to old ALC,
$2.4 million was used to satisfy old ALC's debts to the Bank.
ALC began losing money after only a few months of operation
and by September 19, 1975, had to borrow an additional
$100,000 from the Bank for operations.1
Less than a month later ESOT and ALC were in default.
The Bank began dishonoring ALC's checks and requested a se-
curity interest in equipment and inventory, but was refused. At
that time ALC owed approximately $400,000 in unsecured debt.
On October 23, 1975, the Bank told ALC that no further ad-
vances would be made, that ALC was considered in default, and
that all funds in the Bank's custody were being used to offset
214. See In re Bird Eng'g, Inc., 47 Bankr. 193 (Bankr. D. Nebr. 1985); In re An-
toine's Indus., Inc., 49 Bankr. 82 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984); In re De Feo Fruit Co., 24
Bankr. 220 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982).
215. 5 Bankr. 470 (D. Minn. 1980). This case was decided under the 1898 Bank-
ruptcy Act.
216. Id. at 472-73.
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ALC's obligations. The following day ALC granted the security
interest in inventory and equipment.
2 17
The Bank assumed effective control of ALC immediately af-
terward. It received and opened all ALC's incoming mail, depos-
ited all amounts received by ALC in an account controlled solely
by the Bank, fired ALC's employees, hired a security service to
guard ALC's premises, honored checks presented by ALC payees
only to the extent that such payment would enhance the value
of an ALC asset in which the Bank had a perfected security in-
terest, rehired a "skeleton crew" to aid in liquidating ALC, and
advanced funds necessary to complete those projects in which
failure to pay would lessen the value of ALC's accounts receiva-
ble. In addition, the Bank twice reassured third parties that
ALC was not insolvent and that liquidation would be orderly,
intimating that something would be salvaged for the unsecured
creditors. Less than a month after taking control of the debtor,
the Bank gave notice of foreclosure of its security interest and
then sold the inventory and equipment, keeping all proceeds.218
The foreclosure of the security interest in inventory and
equipment and the Bank's retention of the proceeds destroyed
the unsecured creditors' only possibility of payment. The court
found that this course of conduct was both inequitable and inju-
rious and concluded that subordination was justified:
Subordination of the Bank's claim is not inconsistent with the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. Indeed, failure to
subordinate in this case would be contrary to its goal. While
defendant argues that subordination will cause members of the
financial community to feel that they cannot give financial as-
sistance to failing companies, but must instead foreclose on
their security interests and collect debts swiftly, not leaving
any chance for survival, the Court is singularly unimpressed.
What the Bank did was not an attempt to save ALC from
failure, or even to legitimately cover its own losses. It sought to
perpetuate a fraud upon the general unsecured creditors of
ALC. This kind of conduct cannot be allowed to prevail.
2 19
Another bank's claim was subordinated in In re Sepco,
2 20
217. Id. at 473-74.
218. Id. at 474.
219. Id. at 478-79.
220. 36 Bankr. 279 (Bankr. D.S.D.), aff'd, 758 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1984).
668 [Vol. 37
42
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1986], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss4/5
EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION
this time because the bank had prepared a document called an
"Offer of Sale." "Buried in the middle of the so-called 'Offer of
Sale' -1221 was a lien subordination clause that made the bank's
security interest superior to an existing mechanic's lien. The
South Dakota bankruptcy court held that the bank had pro-
cured the subordination agreement by fraud, that the bank was
equitably estopped from enforcing the agreement against the
mechanic's lienholder, that there was a total failure of considera-
tion, and that the bank would be unjustly enriched if the agree-
ment were enforced. For these reasons, the court subordinated
the bank's claim to that of the mechanic's lienholder.
The Sepco court did not discuss the significance of the
bank's status as a noncontrolling noninsider. Admittedly, this
fact was of little practical significance because the bank's con-
duct satisfied the standards set forth in Teltronics 222 (fraud and
overreaching) and in Osborne (misrepresentation).2 Unfortu-
nately, the decision did little to clear the theoretical haze sur-
rounding this subject. The Sepco court also followed Mobile
Steel's allocation of proof and extended its application to non-
controlling noninsiders, implicitly rejecting the Osborne hold-
ing.224 Finally, the Sepco opinion adopted the view that "inequi-
table conduct . .. need not be related to the acquisition or
assertion of the controverted claim as long as it is directed to-
ward the bankrupt or its creditors.
'225
In In re Answerfone, Inc.,226 a bankruptcy court once again
considered a case of alleged insider misconduct. Answerfone was
an Arkansas corporation that was apparently in sound financial
condition through 1982. In early 1983 Joe Limerick arranged to
purchase Answerfone from its owners through a shell corpora-
tion owned and operated by Limerick's personal secretary, W.
N. Thompson. Thompson and Limerick personally guaranteed
the secured note covering the purchase price. Immediately after
the sale the shell corporation, Answerfone, and Thompson, indi-
vidually, executed a note for almost $800,000 plus interest, paya-
221. Id. at 282.
222. See supra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 196-210 and accompanying text.
224. Sepco did not refer to Osborne and, on this point, seems irreconcilable with
that case. See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
225. 36 Bankr. at 287.
226. 48 Bankr. 24 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985).
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ble to Joe Limerick. The note was allegedly in consideration for
"consulting services" and obligated the makers to pay in excess
of $5,000,000 over a seventy-year period. The note was secured
by a lien on all outstanding stock in both corporations and by all
of Answerfone's assets. Afterward Limerick and Thompson be-
gan to siphon off Answerfone's assets and removed over $200,000
within six months, while Answerfone's creditors went unpaid.2 27
The court held that Limerick's claim was patently fraudu-
lent and that he was an insider because he owned or controlled
all the debtor's stock. Applying the tripartite Mobile Steel test,
the court subordinated Limerick's claim to all other claims ex-
cept those for interest.
228
The court also subordinated the seller's claims, noting that
payments of $150,000 toward the purchase price had come
wholly from Answerfone's assets. Although Limerick and
Thompson had personally guaranteed the note,2 9 the practical
result was that the corporation was paying for its own stock,
while legitimate creditors went unpaid. The seller's claim was
subordinated to the claims of all creditors except Joe
Limerick. °
H. Ninth Circuit
1. Claims Not Subordinated
In re Westgate-California Corp.23' is one of the most fre-
quently cited post-Mobile Steel cases. Although courts have re-
peatedly stated or implied that Westgate adopted the Mobile
Steel test,232 the Westgate court relied primarily on In re Ahl-
swede.2 3 The court cited Mobile Steel solely for the proposition
that subordination ought not to be imposed as a penalty234 and
227. Id. at 25-26.
228. Id. at 26-29.
229. Id. at 31.
230. The court came as close as it probably could to telling the trustee of its
favorable inclination toward motions to set aside both claims entirely. See id. at 29, 30.
231. 642 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1981).
232. See, e.g., Washington Plate Glass (supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text);
Answerfone (supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text); Lockwood (supra notes 155-63
and accompanying text).
233. 516 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1975).
234. 642 F.2d at 1178.
670 [Vol. 37
44
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1986], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss4/5
EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION
on that basis refused to subordinate claims made by the wife of
the man who had controlled the debtor. Although the wife had
committed numerous wrongs, these had been remedied through
litigation and, as a result, the court concluded that "subordina-
tion of all of appellant's claims at this point would be primarily
punitive and not consistent with equitable principles. 2 35 The
dissent, observing that the majority had admitted that the
claimant's fraud had damaged the debtor, argued that "[tihis
was not a single act of inequitable conduct but wrongdoing so
pervasive and so damaging to the bankrupt that no court gov-
erned by equitable principles should permit appellant to share
in the assets of [the debtor] on a parity with other creditors and
stockholders.
'23 6
The Westgate decision is somewhat troubling. The opinion
does not clearly state whether all the harm inflicted by the
claimant was remedied by the litigation's outcome. Surely a
court should place the burden of proving this issue on the per-
son found guilty of "conversion, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty
and falsification of records, 23 7 and any doubts should be re-
solved against the guilty claimant. In this case the claimant
forced the debtor to go to a magistrate, the district court, and
the court of appeals before she made good the damage she had
inflicted. The process took six years and must have imposed a
considerable burden on the debtor. Yet the court apparently did
not consider these wrongs in its equation.
One other Ninth Circuit case cited the Mobile Steel test. In
In re Delta Smelting & Refining Alaska, Inc.,238 an Alaska
bankruptcy court referred to the decision in a footnote,2 39 but
seems not to have applied its test.
I. Tenth Circuit
Although one Tenth Circuit opinion cited Mobile Steel,
240
as of this writing no cases from that circuit appear to have ap-
235. Id. at 1179.
236. Id. (Solomon, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 1176.
238. 53 Bankr. 877 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1985).
239. Id. at 886 n. 9.
240. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Bokum Resources Corp., 40 Bankr. 274, 296
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1983).
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plied the three-part test.
J. Eleventh Circuit
1. Claims Not Subordinated
In In re Pancho's International, Inc.,241 a Florida bank-
ruptcy court refused to subordinate an insider's claim on the ba-
sis of undercapitalization. The court held that, even assuming
that the debtor was undercapitalized, the movant would have to
show inequitable conduct by the insider. The court also asserted
that "[w]ith the adoption of. . .Section 510(c), it is clear that
[the third prong] of the [Mobile Steel] test will rarely, if ever,
come into play.
'242
A Georgia bankruptcy court rejected a similar undercapital-
ization argument in In re N & D Properties, Inc.243 The court
also distinguished that case from In re Carolee's Combine,
Inc.2 4 and refused to find that a bona fide assignment of a se-
curity interest to the claimant, a 45% owner of the debtor, cre-
ated a secret lien.2 " Finally, the court found no instances of in-
equitable conduct or self-dealing and expressed a determination
to protect minority shareholders who are unfamiliar with a cor-
poration's financial condition:
Mrs. Estes' position and conduct in light of the controlling
law is not the only factor which convinces this court that equi-
table subordination of her claim would be inappropriate. Such
a holding would only serve to punish those who are not in-
formed lenders to corporations run by friends and family.
2 6
241. 26 Bankr. 5 (Bankr. M.D. Fi. 1982).
242. Id. at 9.
243. 54 Bankr. 590 (N.D. Ga. 1985). The court also relied on the fact that the claim-
ant was a minority shareholder who had neither direct nor indirect control of the corpo-
ration, id. at 603, and who, therefore, had no duty to determine the financial state of the
debtor before agreeing to pledge or guarantee loans. The court's decision may have been
influenced by its opinion of the trustee's method and manner of proceeding against the
claimant. See 54 Bankr. at 600 n. 4, 605 n. 9.
244. 3 Bankr. 324 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). See supra notes 95-100 and accompany-
ing text.
245. 54 Bankr. at 599.
246. Id. at 604.
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2. Claims Subordinated
In 1982 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the. North-
ern District of Georgia decided In re Greenbrook Carpet Co.
247
In that case the same officers controlled both a parent and a
subsidiary corporation. The parent corporation, J.E.G., received
certain payments from its subsidiary, Greenbrook, within the
preference period preceding the filing of an involuntary bank-
ruptcy petition against Greenbrook. J.E.G. transferred close to
$74,000 of these funds to Calhoun First National Bank (CFNB)
to pay off part of a loan. Greenbrook's trustee in bankruptcy was
able to recover the payments from CFNB because CFNB had
knowledge of Greenbrook's insolvency and was aware of J.E.G.'s
dependency on funds received from Greenbrook. Thus, CFNB
was not a good faith transferee of the preferential payments re-
ceived by J.E.G.
A month after an order for relief was filed against Green-
brook, J.E.G. received and retained a tax refund check for busi-
ness losses sustained in the prior year. Without the trustee's
knowledge J.E.G. applied $1,700 of the refund due Greenbrook
to its own claim against Greenbrook's trustee for administrative
rent. The balance of the refund due Greenbrook was subse-
quently placed in a joint certificate of deposit in the names of
Greenbrook's trustee and J.E.G.'s attorney.
24s
Greenbrook's trustee argued that J.E.G.'s claim for adminis-
trative rent should be subordinated to other creditors' claims be-
cause of J.E.G.'s inequitable conduct-the transfer of preferen-
tial payments to CFNB and the disposition of the tax refund.
The court subordinated J.E.G.'s claim, but did not rely on the
common corporate control of the debtor and J.E.G. Instead, the
court followed the Mobile Steel test and focused on the injury to
other creditors resulting from the corporate officers' inequitable
conduct. Those officers not only appropriated Greenbrook's tax
refund check, but also attempted to use funds received from
Greenbrook to avoid personal liability on the CFNB debt. Fi-
nally, the court concluded that subordination of J.E.G.'s claim
for administrative rent would be consistent with the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code, but did not even consider the claim's
247. 22 Bankr. 86 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982).
248. Id. at 87-89.
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statutory priority.2 49
In In re Sayman's, Inc.,250 the same bankruptcy court or-
dered subordination of a claim based on a creditor's inequitable
conduct that was wholly unrelated to the creation or the asser-
tion of the creditor's prepetition claim. Sometime after the filing
of the petition but before appointment of the trustee, the claim-
ant, Southwestern Bell, had discontinued the debtor's phone
service without the court's permission. The trustee tendered an
additional deposit, as demanded by Southwestern Bell, but ser-
vice was not immediately restored. This delay hampered the sale
of the debtor's inventory. The court found that all three parts of
the Mobile Steel test were satisfied and subordinated all South-
western Bell's claims.25'
VI. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to ascertain whether the courts have been more
or less prone to order subordination of a shareholder's claim
since the Mobile Steel decision. Mere numbers of decisions to
subordinate or not to subordinate particular claims cannot pro-
vide an answer because each decision must rest on its particular
facts. It does appear that the Mobile Steel opinion imposed cer-
tain constraints on the court's use of its broad equitable powers.
Most significant, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
fused to subordinate the claim in question after setting forth its
threshold requirements for ordering equitable subordination.
The decisions discussed above indicate a certain reluctance
by the courts to order subordination of a claim. On the other
hand, when the courts have decided to subordinate a claim, they
have clearly provided that justice be fully carried out.
5 1
Whether the Mobile Steel test and its attendant principles
have added anything to the predictability and consistency of
outcomes in these cases is also a difficult question. The fact situ-
ations underlying the claims are so diverse that comparison of
results is practically impossible.53 The argument for equitable
249. Id. at 91-92.
250. 15 Bankr. 229 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
251. Id. at 231.
252. See, e.g., Carolee's Combine, Inc. (supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text);
Greenbrook Carpet Co. (supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text).
253. The apparent discrepancy between the holdings in Greenbrook Carpet (supra
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subordination of a claim appears to arise most often when some
form of fraud, mismanagement, or breach of fiduciary duty is
present. There is little to indicate that either undercapitalizaiton
or the alter ego argument could alone support an order for equi-
table subordination, even though the Mobile Steel guidelines
would appear to permit that decision. Thus, the courts seem to
have interpreted the first prong of the Mobile Steel test
narrowly.
One of the most important developments since Mobile Steel
has been the treatment of noninsider claimants. The Teltron-
ics254 court, for example, adopted a restrictive view of noninsider
subordination, and seems to have concluded that insider claims
should be subordinated only upon a showing of either near total
dominance coupled with inequitable conduct or particularly
egregious conduct. As the Osborne court noted, however, the
Teltronics "gross misconduct" standard is poorly defined and
difficult to apply.255 Pat Freeman,256 on the other hand, sug-
gested, inter alia, that creditor misrepresentation relied upon by
other creditors to their detriment could justify equitable subor-
dination without regard to the amount of control the creditor
exercised over the debtor.
An issue that has only recently arisen, and the significance
of which cannot yet be determined, comes out of Missionary
Baptist.257 On remand the bankruptcy court subordinated a
claim based not on the claimant's own inequitable conduct but
on inequitable conduct imputed to the claimant. This view may
significantly expand the availability of equitable subordination,
depending on how other courts receive it and what limits they
place upon it.
notes 247-49 and accompanying text), and Dade County Dairies (supra notes 63-66 and
accompanying text), which both involved claims for administrative rent, can be at least
partially explained by the fact that some of the alleged inequitable conduct in Green-
brook Carpet occurred after the corporation was already involved in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, while the alleged inequitable conduct in Dade County Dairies occurred prior to
bankruptcy. The result in Greenbrook Carpet seems more equitable to outside creditors.
254. See supra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 196-210 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text. See also In re Just For the Fun
of It of Tenn., Inc., 7 Bankr. 166, 180 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980)(general contractor's
claim subordinated because he filed a false, misleading, and invalid notice of complaint
"on which other creditors relied in extending credit to the debtor").
257. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text, 109-14 and accompanying text.
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In applying the second prong of the Mobile Steel test,
courts have relied almost exclusively on the injury to the bank-
rupt's creditors. Opinions rarely even mention the second aspect
of this prong-unfair advantage to the claimant-perhaps be-
cause it is usually superfluous.
The third prong of the Mobile Steel test-consistency with
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code-has proved the least
useful. Courts that have applied this prong have usually con-
strued it as referring only to general equitable principles. This
requirement, therefore, has added little to the pre-Mobile Steel
view of when equitable subordination is justified. Further, it ap-
pears that courts have increasingly glossed over this factor or
ignored it altogether. Only one court appears to have refused to
subordinate a claim solely on the basis of inconsistency with the
Code. 258 Clearly, parties that claim under Code-prescribed pri-
orities cannot expect a court to deny equitable subordination
solely on the basis that the remedy is inconsistent with the pro-
visions of the Code. By its very nature, equitable subordination
has no other purpose than to alter the Congressionally man-
dated scheme of priorities because of equitable factors that are
difficult to incorporate into legislation.
The aspect of Mobile Steel that has apparently had the
greatest impact upon subsequent cases is the allocation of the
burden of proof. Requiring the trustee to present some substan-
tial factual basis for his argument that a claim should be subor-
dinated is consistent with the policy allowing the owners of a
close corporation to provide financial support for their business.
In fact, several of the decisions discussed above turned on the
burden of proof issue.259 Under this approach, a shareholder who
lends money to his corporation in good faith should be fairly se-
cure that his claim for repayment will be honored in the event of
his corporation's bankruptcy.
The Mobile Steel test, however, is capable of flexible appli-
cation. Although subsequent cases appear to impose a heavier
burden on an objectant to a noninsider's claim, it is significant
that the doctrine of equitable subordination has even been ex-
tended to claims of noninsiders. Claimants must, therefore, exer-
258. See Dade County Dairies (supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text).
259. See, e.g., Georgian Villa (supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text); Mission-
ary Baptist (supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text, 109-14 and accompanying text).
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cise caution in the amount of "control" they exert over debtors
in furtherance of thei interests and must always consider the
effect of their actions on other creditors.
The Mobile Steel opinion did not prescribe strict rules for
ordering equitable subordination of a claim, but merely enunci-
ated principles that a court should consider in making its deci-
sion. Although the guidelines impose more concrete standards
than the pre-Mobile Steel "fair play and good conscience" tests,
they also allow the court to adapt its decision to the facts of a
particular case. This flexibility is highly desirable in the litiga-
tion of an equitable issue, particularly since corporate transac-
tions can take so many different forms.
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